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View from the inside – Markets for carbon credits to fi ght 
climate change: addressing corruption risks proactively
Jørund Buen1 and Axel Michaelowa2
A general scientifi c consensus has established a relationship between the accumulation 
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and global warming. In response, more than 180 
countries have ratifi ed the Kyoto Protocol, which caps greenhouse gas emissions in indus-
trialised countries at around 5 per cent below their 1990 levels.
Kyoto contains several important market mechanisms that are intended to ensure that 
the required cuts can be made most effectively and effi ciently. One of them is the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), whereby the private and public sectors can invest in 
emission reduction projects in developing countries and receive related emission reduction 
credits, which are tradable in so-called ‘compliance markets’ and can be bought by emitters 
to offset their own emissions. Similarly, under Kyoto’s Joint Implementation (JI) scheme, 
 1 Jørund Buen is a senior partner at Point Carbon, a research and consulting fi rm with headquarters in Oslo.
 2 Axel Michaelowa is a senior founding partner at Perspectives GmbH, a research and consulting fi rm based in 
Zurich and Hamburg, that provides project review and management services related to the Clean Development 
Mechanism.
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investors from one industrialised country can engage in an emission reduction project in 
another industrialised country and use the credits they obtain through this to meet their 
own compliance targets.
Some doubt the general viability of these mechanisms and fear that they distract from 
the more fundamental structural policy changes that are needed to tackle climate change. 
Carbon trading is here to stay, however, and is expected to grow considerably in the near 
future. It is certainly not the only answer to climate change, but an integral element of the 
overall solution.
International carbon markets have grown almost exponentially since their inception in 
the late 1990s. By 2007 2.7 billion tonnes of carbon-dioxide-equivalent emissions with a 
total value of €40 billion had been traded globally, of which about one-third were CDM- 
and JI-related offsets.3 The future size of these markets depends on whether policy-makers 
agree on further reductions after the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012, as well the level of 
US participation. Even in a low-growth scenario, the market will probably be several times 
larger than it is today. In a high-growth scenario, it may grow by a factor of almost thirty 
by 2020.4
New markets – new risks of corruption?
Theoretically, the nature of carbon markets might present a number of corruption risks, 
but most of them have been addressed by the regulatory design of the compliance markets 
under Kyoto.5 One potential challenge is that carbon markets deal with intangible assets 
(carbon offsets). Compared to markets for tangible objects with apparent physical charac-
teristics – apples, for example – the quality and veracity of carbon intangibles are poten-
tially diffi cult to verify ‘on the spot’ by the purchaser in markets in which certifi cates 
and not products with physical characteristics change hands. The tracking of certifi cates 
through registries, as well as the independent verifi cation of emission reductions that give 
rise to certifi cates, are therefore key elements in regulated carbon credit markets, and have 
been fully implemented in the Kyoto Protocol compliance market.
The only open fl ank of the compliance markets is the check of the general eligibility of a 
project under the project-based mechanisms CDM and JI. Offsets are valid and make an 
effective contribution to reducing carbon emissions only if they are awarded for projects 
that would not otherwise have taken place. This additionality criterion is diffi cult to ascer-
tain and can provide scope for manipulation. Here there is an ongoing ‘cat and mouse’ 
game between project developers, who try to get projects that would have happened 
anyway approved as additional, and the regulators, who have developed detailed rules to 
prevent such projects from qualifying under the mechanisms. In broader perspective, this 
underlines the fact that carbon markets are political constructs in which products, values 
 3 K. Røine, E. Tvinnereim and H. Hasselknippe (eds.), Carbon 2008: Post-2012 Is Now (Oslo: Point Carbon, 2008).
 4 Carbon Market Analyst (Norway), 21 May 2008.
 5 Some of these conceptual ideas have been presented by J. Werksman, of the World Resources Institute, at the 
thirteenth International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC), Athens, 30 October 2008.
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and their distribution are critically shaped by rules and regulations, which as a consequence 
become the focus of intense lobbying, some of which might degenerate into corruption. 
Against this backdrop, it is quite striking that published allegations and evidence about 
corruption in the carbon market are still very rare.6 The following sections discuss some of 
the key challenges in more detail.
Additionality in practice
Carbon credits are awarded to CDM and JI projects if they can prove that they face prohibi-
tive barriers, or that another way of producing the same service or product would be more 
profi table and thus would have been chosen instead of the less carbon-emitting method. In 
most cases, the cited obstacles are real, and the claim that the low-carbon alternative is not 
profi table enough to go forward without revenues from carbon offsets is correct. It is very 
diffi cult to be absolutely sure, however. As a result, a number of commentators claim that 
CDM and JI projects are not always leading to real emission reductions,7 and some even 
link this directly to corruption.8
Project developers seeking carbon credits need to make detailed documentation publicly 
available for stakeholder comments, resulting in a high degree of transparency that is likely 
to deter corruption. One of the authors personally witnessed a corruption attempt in India, 
however, where a project developer on whose project the author had submitted a critical 
public comment proposed a ‘fee’ to write a positive report.
The need to prove additionality has probably tempted some project developers to forge 
documents in order to qualify for the CDM. Indeed, the CDM executive board has recently 
referred to ‘incidents of attempts of falsifi cation of documents by project participants’.9
Market players in India say that CDM project developers frequently backdate documents 
in order to show that they considered the CDM before they started the project. Another 
tactic is manipulating rate of return calculations to make it appear that CDM revenue 
would push the project above a certain profi tability level that determines execution. 
Moreover, CDM consultants in India have on at least a couple of occasions copied and 
pasted  stakeholder consultations carried out for one project into documentation for other 
projects.10 To prevent such behaviour, British CDM authorities require project developers 
 6 See K. Holliday, ‘Clean and transparent’, Energy Risk; available at www.energyrisk.com/public/showPage.
html?page=834295.
 7 A. Michaelowa and K. Umamaheswaran, Additionality and Sustainable Development Issues Regarding CDM Projects 
in Energy Effi ciency Sector, Discussion Paper no. 346 (Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics, 
2006); L. Schneider, Is the CDM Fulfi lling Its Environmental and Sustainable Development Objectives? (Berlin: Öko-
Institut, 2007); M. W. Wara and D. G. Victor, A Realistic Policy on International Carbon Offsets, Working Paper no. 
74 (Stanford, CA: Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, Stanford University, 2008).
 8 Guardian (UK), 21 May 2008.
 9 CDM Accreditation Panel, Twenty-sixth Progress Report of the CDM Accreditation Panel (New York: CDM Accreditation 
Panel, 2008).
10 Point Carbon, Consulting Firms Deny Wrongdoing in Drafting Indian PDDs (Oslo: Point Carbon, 2005); A. 
Michaelowa, ‘Experiences in Evaluation of PDDs, Validation and Verifi cation Reports’, paper presented at Austrian 
JI/CDM workshop, Vienna, 26 January 2007.
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to sign a declaration certifying that their information is correct, and hold them criminally 
liable if fraud is discovered.
Corruption risks for certifying agencies
In order to obtain carbon credits, project buyers need host- and investor-country approval, 
validation of the project documentation by an accredited third party, international UN 
approval and third-party verifi cation of project operations compared to the plan. The 
‘street-level’ staff in some of these organisations are not paid particularly well, and can be 
inexperienced, due to the rapid development of the market.
Project approval by host countries is, arguably, the stage most vulnerable to corruption. 
Although kickbacks to offi cials have not been reported, a Russian agency reportedly asked 
for direct monetary payments.11 In South-east Asian countries, it is fairly common for 
developers to invite the authorities to workshops (with attractive per diems) before submit-
ting projects for approval. In China, it is not uncommon for project developers to invite 
experts reviewing their projects to dinner. On the other hand, the Indonesian Designated 
National Authority has an elaborate ethics code that aims at preventing corruption.12
Ambivalent incentives and revolving doors for expert consultants
Ensuring the integrity of the expert consultants involved can also be a challenge. In 
China, consultant fees are capped, and these experts cannot take a share of carbon credits 
as payment. The unintended consequence seems to be that consultants charge sepa-
rate, undisclosed fees to both the seller and the buyer of the same project. In the United 
Kingdom, buyers are barred from making such payments.13
Assessing CDM projects requires detailed technical competence and an intimate under-
standing of the CDM. Because very few people fulfi l these criteria, potential confl icts of 
interest have been very diffi cult to avoid. Several project consultants also conduct expert 
project reviews for the CDM’s executive board. In addition, consultants assess project 
baseline and monitoring methodologies, and theoretically could block methodologies 
submitted by their competitors. To our knowledge, there are no quarantine rules prevent-
ing executive board members from entering the private sector as lobbyists, and at least two 
members were hired by companies submitting projects after their terms on the board had 
expired.
11 A. Korppoo, ‘JI Projects in Russian Energy Sector’, paper presented at St Petersburg, 30 September 2005.
12 Government of Indonesia, ‘Code of Conducts (2007)’, available at dna-cdm.menlh.go.id/en/about/?pg=ethic.
13 L. Mortimer, ‘Overly Protective?’, in Environmental Finance, Global Carbon 2008 (London: Environmental 
Finance, 2008).
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Strengthening governance for improving the markets for carbon 
credits
Corruption risks in markets for carbon credits could be reduced by making procedures more 
standardised and transparent. More specifi cally, this could include:
not awarding carbon credits to projects if they are not submitted for UN approval within  ●
a limited time period after investment decisions are made;
selecting members for the UN bodies approving carbon projects based on professional  ●
competence rather than geographical representation, granting them legal immunity and 
requiring them to state their current and previous roles and potential confl icts of interest 
in detail in a publicly available document;
where feasible, making summaries of the contents of discussions relating to the approval  ●
of CDM (as well as relevant JI) projects publicly available; and
restricting situations in which former regulators work for private companies, and  ●
perhaps vice versa.
A host of additional corruption risks
Discussions, both under the auspices of the UN and in many individual countries, are under 
way on how to design the post-Kyoto carbon market, after the protocol expires in 2012. 
One lesson to draw from the experience with carbon markets so far is that particular atten-
tion should be paid to new market segments for which data are limited or additionality 
criteria are particularly diffi cult to prove. These could include credits for avoided deforesta-
tion, carbon capture and storage, aviation and marine transport.
The sale of governments’ Kyoto units presents another accountability challenge. Since 
former Soviet bloc countries were allocated Kyoto allowances based on their economic activ-
ity before the 1990 collapse, they have many surplus allowances to sell. If these countries 
fulfi l a number of (relatively strict) criteria they can implement JI14 projects, for which no 
international third-party checking or UN approval is needed. In principle, they can thereby 
transfer some of their surplus allowances to buyers via JI. Revenues from such sales could be 
signifi cant – in the billions of euros in the cases of Russia and Ukraine. It is not clear which 
government organisations in these countries have the authority to sell the surplus and how 
transparently and accountably such transfers of public wealth will be carried out.
A fi nal area of concern is the voluntary carbon credit market, in which companies and 
individuals without formal compliance obligations can buy offsets to compensate for their 
carbon footprint. While standards have been developed for such markets and most players 
act responsibly, a lack of regulation poses the risk of fraud – for example, the selling of one 
and the same emissions reduction to several customers.
14 So-called ‘Track 1’ JI projects.
